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THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE AND
THE USE OF THE ARMED FORCES ABROAD
John N. Moore
The breadth of my assigned topic
"The National Executive and International Law" suggests that my mission
this morning is about like that of the
fan dancer; to call attention to the
suhject without really covering it. But
rather than attempt a superficial survey
of the range of problems in allocating
the foreign affairs power hetween ConW"('SS, the President, and the Court, it
may he mom rewarclin~ lo instead ('on('I'nlrale on the l'urrenlly mosl imporlant of lllOse prohlems. the power of
lhe Pn'sidenl to usc the Armed Forccs
ahroad.
Ilislorirally, the controversy ovcr the
war power and the controversy over lhe
treaty power seem to have been the
most imporlant constitulional issues in
the scope of the Prcsident's fOf('ign
affairs power. Of these, the trcaty
power conlroversy has heen in alleast a
state of temporary quiescence since the
healed conlroversv in 19S4 over the
Brir"l'r amellllml'l;l. With the defeal hy
a lIarrow margill of lhl' Brieker allll'lIll1lI1'lIl, whil'h had 1.1'1'11 ailllt'd al n'~lrklinl! the I'n'sidl'lIl '8 powcr to makc
illll'rnaliollal agn'emellls, this cOlllroversy was resolved ill favor of a COII-

tinnillg hroad view of I';xel'utive authority. In (;ontrast, the dehate Oil
Vielnam has heated white hol the eontroversy over lhc ex tent of Presidential
power to use the Armed Forces ahroad,
and has generated a concern with Presidential power as insistent as any in our
century. 1
Basically the controversy eoneerns
the authority of the President to order
the Armed Forces into combat abroad
and the question of when and how
Congress must authorize the usc of the
Armed Forces abroad. Although this
problem is presented morc drama tically
today than ever before, it is not new.
i\luch of the current debate borrows
argument from the clashes of .I efferson
and lIamilton over the power of the
President in the WOl naval war against
the Bashaw of Tripoli and from the
rhetoric of President Polk and Representative Abraham Lincoln in the IB46
i\lexiean War.
The starling point of the dehate is
the Constitution, which gives Conf.,'Tess
the power to declare war and to raisl~
and support Armies and which makl's
the President the Conllnander in Chief
and in practical effl'ct the chief repre-
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sentative of the nation in foreign affairs.
IL seems reasonably clear from the
debates at the Fedeml Constitutional
Convention that most of the framers
sought to place the major war power in
Conl"rress and to leave the President only
the right to repcl sudden allacks. The
framers sought this restriction on Presidential power because of their fear of
concentrated power in the President.
But the convention debates are not very
useful in telling us who has power in
situations which may be short of war or
in resolving controversy about how Congress might authorize the President to
usc the Army and Navy. I\loreover, the
Constitution is .1 living dOl'lllnent, and
its nll'aning is shaped hy tl\(' c"pc'ric'III'e
of slu'c'c'ssin' (:ongressc's ;lIId Presidents
in filling: in its broad outlinl's 111111 in
adapting it to changing cirelllllstances.
As i\lr . .J ustice Frankfurter pointed out:
"It is an inadmissihly narrow conception of American eOJJ::;titutional law to
confine it to the words of the Constitutioll and to disregard the gloss which life
has written upon them.,,2 Nowhere is
this statement or that of 1\1r. .Justice
Holmes that "the life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experienc(,,,3
been more apt than in the interpretation
of the war power.
In the 180 years since the adoption
of the Constitution, our nation has
moved from a position of comparative
isolation epitomized by Washington's
warning to stay clear of entangling
alliances to one of intense international
involvement evidenced in 1968 by
agreements for collcctive defense with
42 countries. In the same period the
international system has shifted from a
balance of power system to a loose
bipolar system marked by intense global
competition among competing public
order systems and a nuclear halance of
terror. And international law has movcd
frolll the notion of a just war to the
prohihition of all for('(' as a nH'ans of
lIlajor change under the lI.N. Charter.
The increasing involvement of the

United States in world affairs, the shift
to an intensely competitive bipolar
system, and the limitation of thc lawful
use of force to defense have /:orreally
strcngthened the hand of the Exccutive
in the contest with Congress over the
war power. Hamilton and .Jefferson
fought over whelher, in the absence of
congressional authorization to usc force,
a Tripolitan cruiser must be released
after capture by an American naval
vessel. .Jefferson took the position that
in the absence of congressional authorization for U.S. Naval forces to go on the
offensive, the cruiser must be released
after being disabled from commiLLing
furth('r hostilities. Bllt the eOlltempo·
rary elc'hatc' is abollt Ihc' powc'r III
cOllllllil from a '1"al'tc'l' 10 II half lIlillion
troops in lIlajor wars slleh as Kon'a and
Vietnalll. As the contmst in subjcets
dc'baled shows. IIll'rl' ha~ IlI'l'n a I-rraelual
ilJ('r<~a!'e in Pre~irlelltial power to lise the
military ahroad over this period, an
incrl'm~e whieh has ael'e1erated during
the 20th century.
Some comlllentators such as Professor Wormuth and Senator Fulhright tell
us that the increase in Presid('ntial
power vis·a·vis Conhrress has gOtH' too
far. They painL a pil'lure of E:'\ccutivc
usurpation of authority. But though
they have a great deal to show us, the
trouble is thaL the frame they use may
he too small. We cannot just look to the
language of the Constitution or th(,
ex perienee of 150 years ago for the
answer to prohlems and conditions not
wholly antieipated. If we arc to display
a proper instinct for the jU{rular instead
of an instinct for the capillaries, we
must apply the policy of the framers to
the diverse pr~hlems and conditions of
today.
The policy of requiring congressional
authority for the major usc of force
abroad as a check on Presidential power
remains as valid today, if not lIlore so,
than in 1789. But prohlellls of colh'rtivc
defense pursuant to treaty obligalions,
the need for implementation of sane-
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tions under article 42 of the United
Nations Charter, an increasin!!:ly glohal
dcfl'n~e inLl'rdcpClllhme!'. the wide rang('
of rt'~pon:;es to siLuaLion8 of intra~Late
conflict, ami the swiftness of modern
aLLal'k militate against ahsolu te answers
based on that policy.
The nature of our prohlem is 81lch
that we arc unlikely to find many of
what i\lr. Justice Frankfurter termed
bright-linc distinctions. It will hclp immeasurahly. however, if we first brieOy
intlulge in the luxury of a minimum of
clarification ahout the nature of the
major questions we must deal with.
Although there are really JIlany more, as
a fir~L-slage complexiLy iL is (~onvcnil'nt
to Lak(, four q u('sLions. Wilh t'aeh \\"t'
an' l'llI\('('rt\('(1 wil hauL horizal ion to USt'
tlw :\rt\wd Forces ahroad in confli(,t
~iLuaLions.

First, wh:11 \IIay I II!' Pr(~sitlt'nL do on
own authority without congressional
authorization? S('cond. if conwessional
authorizalion is ne(~cssary, what form
must it take? I\lust there be a formal
tler.Jaration of war? Third, what terms
of congressional authorization arc valid'?
Can Conwess tldegalt! the authority to
u:;e Lroops abro:ul to I he l'rcsi(h'nt, a1111,
if so, how broad a delegaLion is permis~ihle? Lastly. to what ('xtent can the
answers to the first three qucstions be
rerolved by thc eourts? Are they "polilical qnestions" or oLhl'rwise issues which
it i8 ullwi8(' for a (~ourt to adjudicaLe'?
Failure to separate these questions has
carried more than its share of confusion.
I will deal with these one at a time and
then apply them all to the Vietnam
situation.
First, what may the President do on
his OWII authority without congrcssional
authorization?
There is no douht that the President,
acting on his own authority, may order
the military to repel sudden attacks on
the United States or American forces.
Th(' draft proposals of the Constitution
initially contailH'tl language :lUthorizing
Conhrress to "make war," hut at the
hi~

instance of .Iamcs i\ladison the language
was changed from "to make war" to "to
tll'dare war." The n'ason given for till'
changt~ was to leave to til(! l'n'sident
"the power to repel sudden attack."
Beyond that, there is greater controversy. On the one hand, there arc those
who take a broad view of Presidential
power such as Craig I\Iathews who
writes:
Constitutional history has shown
that the I'resid('nt can take military
aetioll ulld!'r his indcpendrnt powrrs
whenever the intl'rests of the Unitrd
States so require. In the modern world
the scope of America's interest can be
determined only by reference to the
slat!' of affairs in the intrrnational
arena as a who\!' allll to Iht' OVt,r:tll
purpOSt'" of

our forl'il!1I polky. AllY

ri~id

tl'''1 of prolt't'labh' illlt'rt'si wouhl
Irav!' the nalioll dangerously UIIequipped for survivai. 4

Similarly, lInder Secretary Katzenbach, in testifyin~ reeently before the
Scnate Forcign Relations Commillee,
said that he doubts that any President
has ever acted to the full limits of his
Presidential authority.s There is substantial precedent in history for this
broad interpretation of Presidential authority. Former Assistant Seeretary of
State .J ames Grafton Rogers tells us that
in the over 100 uses of U.S. foree's
abroad from 1789 to 1945 that the
Executive ordered the use on his own
authority in at least 80.6 And a 1951
study for the COJllmittee on Foreign
Relations says that: "Since the Constitution was adopted there have heen at
least 125 incidents in which the President, without congressional authorization,.... has ordered the Armed Forces
to take action or maintain positions
abroad. ,,7
Since these studies were completed
we could add President Truman's use of
a quarter of a million American troops
in Korea, President Eisenhower's landing of the marines in Lebanon, President
Kennedy's limited usc of American
forces in the Bay of Pigs invasion and as
":uivis!'rs" in Vietnam, and Pn'sitlcnt
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.I ohnson's

landing 0 f lroops in the
\)ominican Ih'puhlic. All of this certainly represl'nls a suhslantial I!lo~-;
whieh e'(perience has placed on the
Constitution.
On the other hand, those who take a
narrow view of Presidential power, such
as Professor Ruhl Bartlell in testimony
hefore the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee during the National Commitment hearings, point out that most
of these actions, with the greatest exception being Korea, did not involve
sustained hostilities or more than minor
casualties. 8 Typically, they involved
protection of U.S. citizens abroad, pursuit of pirates, alleged humanitarian
intervention. n'prislls, or eonsl'nsu<ll
assistance to a recognized government.
And protracted and sustained use of
troops abroad resulting in substantial
casualties has IIsually been highly controversial; the Korean war and President
Polk's initiation of the Mexican War of
lB46 being prime examples.
Given this de{,tree of disagreement by
sinccre and informed scholars, what
guideposts arc there for delimiting Presidential authority in those situations in
which the President acts without congressional authorization? Although they
ean easily he overstated, there arc some
policy considerations which, in my
opinion. suggest a need for substantial
Presidential authority. First, there is a
need for the President to be able to
4uickly react to sudden armed attacks
threatening U.S. defense interests. The
sudden aLLack in Korea and the rapid
response of President Truman in initiating a process of troop eomlllitnwnt to
Korea is, I helieve, a real example of this
nced. Though suhject to abuse, possibly
some actions to protect American citizens ahroad fall in to all analagous category. The joint United States-Belgian
rescue operation in the Congo and the
first stage of the Dominican operation
are examples. There is also sometimes a
lIeed for secrecy, deeisivencss, and negotiating n:sponsivl'IIl'ss whieh ean hest be

met hy Presidential a<:Lion. In this eall'gory I would citt, the adiolls of Presidellt I\t'llnedy in the Cuhan missi!t:
crisis. It seems to mc that the wisdom of
congressional de hate ahout whether the
response to the Soviet emplacement of
n\t'dium-range ballistic missilcs in Cuha
should be quarantine, air strikes 011 the
missile sites, illvasion of Cuba, or no
response at all, which is the dl'hatt~
which went on within the administration. is open to serious doubt. Robert
Kennedy tells us in his account of the
missile crisis that he doubts as satisfactory an outcome could have bcen
achieved if the oebatc over alternativcs
had takl'n plan' in the full glan' of
puhlil'ity. Alit! letot we l>uct'umh to tlw
myth that the Pre8ident is always hawkish and Congress is always dovish, we
should remember Kennedy's account of
thl' hawkish pressures from II'adillg (:011grc:ssman during the Illissil(' erisis.
There is also a catq~ory of what
might' be called "ongoing comma lit!
deeisions," whieh are day-to-day tll'cisions about the operation of existing
llIilit.1ry assistanec programs within the
network of U.S. t!efl'nse inlert'tots or
about defcnsive deployment of our
Armed Forces. By thl~ir rl'eurn'lIl nature. mau)' of these dedsions inevitably
will he left, in the first instance at least,
to Presidential authority. Examples
would he the et)n!lut'l or ('stabli~11t'11
military advisory nllSslOns, military
assistanec prOhtralllS, and intellig(~I\t'e
missions necessary for national seeurity.
i\loreovt'r, I helit've that some of the
arguments for strictly limiting Prcsidential authority misconceive the nature
of Presidential power and elevate form
over suhstanct'. Presidential power. even
in the exercise of the Commander in
Chief power, is not autonomous ano, as
Richard Neustadt compellingly argues,
is in large measure the power to p('rsuade. 9 It is difficult for a Presitlt'nt to
pur::1ue sustained military al'lions without the active support of a touhslantial
scgmt~nt of Conhtrt's::1 and the Anlt'ril'llll

495
people. And although Congress would
lIsually be reluctant to do so, if things
f!;ot too had Congress could refuse to
appropriate funds or could even institute impeachment proceedings against
the President. And short of these measures, the Congress can bring {.,'Teat
pressure to bear on the President
through the power of critical public
hearings, as the Fulbright hearings on
Vietnam perhaps more than adequately
demonstrate.
Dl'spite these reasons for some Presidential authority in the use of troops
abroad, it neither seems wise nor necessary to cncoura~l' too great an ex pan~iun of Pn'sidl'ntial !H)WI'r. Within the
limits of sun'ival in till' worltl WI' livl' in,
WI' shonltl rl'ljuirl' thl' more broadly
hased authorization whieh only Congress can give I and should strive to
n·vitalilll~ till: rolc~ of Congress in the
making of foreign polil~y.
As a dividing line for Presidcntial
authority in the USI: of the military
abroad, one test might be to require
congressional authorization in all cases
where regular combat units arc COIllmiLLed to sustained hostilities. This test
would be likely to indude most situatiolls resulting in suhstantial casualties
mill substantial cOlllmitmcnt of resourccs. Undcr this tcst, the l"lexican
War, the Korean war, and thl: Vietnam
war would all require conl-'Tessional
authorization. The tcst has the virtue of
responsivencss to pmcisely those situations historically creating the greatest
concern over Presidential authority, hut
like all tests is somewhat frayed at the
edges. In conflicts which gradually escalate, the dividing line for requiring
congressional authorization might be
initial commitment to combat of regular
U.S. combat units as such. As to the
suddenness of Korea, and conflicts like
Korea, I would argue that the President
should have the authority to mect the
aLlack us nccessury but should imnll'diatl'ly ~;(H:k eongn'ssional authorillation. In rl'lrospcct, thc dceisiun not to

obtain formal congressional authorization in the Korean war, in which the
United States sustaincd mort: than
L40,OOO casualties, seems a poor precedenL. And in those situations in which
Presidential authority is based on the
need for secrecy or immediacy of response, the need should be a real one.
To say that the President should have
authority to act in some circumstances
without congressional authorization is
not to advise that he should not consult
Congress or key congressional leaders.
The President should involve Congress
as much as practicable in every case. In
fact, failure to pursue congressional
invulVl'ml'nt meaningfully whl'n it ("uult!
hU\"I' h"l'n IIIII II' ha~ IIl','n till' I·aus,' 0 r II
gn'at Ilt'al of Imneees~ary l'n'sidential
grid. As Under Seeretary Katzen bach
points out "there cun be no question
thut ... I th(" President J acts most crfectiVl'ly when Iw acts with the support
and authority of the Congress."l 0
Thc second question is: When congressional authorization is necessary,
what form should it take? Is a formal
declaration of war required?
l\'1ueh of the popular discussion
ahou t the war power seenlS to assume
that a formal dcdaration of war is the
only means of constitu tionally ohtaining congrcssional authorillation for the
use of the military. But this one is
largely a red herring. As a matter of
logic, the syntax of the Constitution
that "Congrcss should have power
... to declare war" does not mean that
Congress may not authorize hostilities
without a formal declaration of war.
And as a matter of intent of the
framcrs, the requiremcnt is congressional controi of hostilities, not a particular mode of authorization. This was
so clear that within ] 2 years of the
adoption of the Constitution no less an
authorit y than r.hief .I ustice John i\ larl'hall recognized in th(~ l·"l'C of Talbot I'.
11
SCC'lIIa1l
that congn':lsional .. ction not
amounting to u formal dedaration of
war could he a vulid congressional au-
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thorization of hostilities. The ease arose
out of the 1789 naval war with France,
the first war of a fledgling United
States. As a result of French raiding of
American shipping, Con/,rrcss had passed
a series of acts sllslH'ndillg commercial
rclations with France, denouncing the
treaties with France, and estahlishing a
Department of the Navy and a I\larine
Corps. The Court treated these acts as
congressional authorization for limited
hostilities with France. Practice since
then shows that Conl,rress has declared
war only five times, despite the milch
larger number of oeca~ions on \Vhil'h the
linited State~ hi\:'; becn at war. Then' i~
lillie rea~on, then. to helit'vt· that a
formal declaration of war is tht, only
means of congrcssional authorization of
hostilities. A joint congressional resolution, which II\USt be approved by both
houses of Congress, authorizing the
President to usc the military ahroad is
certainly as Under Secretary Katzenbach puts it "a functional equivalent of
the declaration of war."
There arc also numerous policy argumcnt~ why the formal dedaration of
war is undesirable under present circumstances. Argumcnts made include inerem;ed danger of misunderstanding of
limited objectives, diplomatic cmharras:mlCnt in recognition of n()nrt~eog
nized guerrilla opponcnts, inhihition of
settlement possihilities, the danger of
widening thc war, and unnecessarily
increasing a President's domestic authority. Although each of these arguments has some merit, probably the
most compelling reason for not using
the formal declaration of war is that
there is no reason to do so. As former
Secretary of Defense l\leNarnara has
pointed out "IT Ihere has not been a
formal declaration of war--anywhere in
the world-·since World War II. ,,12
I\lore serious questions as to form of
t'onp:t'r:>:>ional all thorizat ion int'I lid t' to
what exll'nt can [on/-.rr(':>8 authorize the
I'n':;itient to engagt' in ho~tilities by
prior approval of an international agree-

ment'? And ·to what extent can con/,rressional acquiescence in appropriation
measures constitute congressional authorization to cngllge in hostilities'? One
ohvious prohlem with treaty authorization is that 1Iithough the 1I01lse of
Representatives would participate in a
declaration of war, it would not participate in trcatymaking. This objection
would be alleviated if the international
agreement took the form of a eongressionlll·exeeu tive agrcemcn t :<anetioned
by a joint resolu tion. Prohlt'nlS in reeo/!:nizing appropriation nll'aSUrt'S as authorization include et>nfronting COIIgrt·:;:; wilh a fait accompli antillSt't'rtain·
illg lltc' :<t'OII(' of t~ollgrt's..;ionlll inlt'nl in
a volt- t() lIpprove an approprilltion
mcasure.
The third question is: What terms of
congressional authorization arc vlllid'?
Can Congress delegate the authority to
use troops abroad to thc President, alHl
if so, how broad a delegation is permissible?
The permissihility of eongressionlll
delegation of the war power to the
President and exactly what constitutes a
delegation have heen disputed throughout U.S. history. In IB:J4 President
Jackson sought congressional authorization to undertake reprisals upon French
property unless France paid her outstanding debts for damages to Ameriean
shipping during the Napolconie wars.
There were objections in Congress on
the grounds that it would amount to an
unconstitutional transfer of Congress'
war power to th(' Presidt'nt, llntl,lat'k:<on
did not get his resolu tion, Similarly, in
18;'7 President B.uchanan sought eongressional auth~)rization to usc the military at his discretion, if necessary to
preserve freedom of communication
across the Isthmus of Panama. Despite
three requests, Congress refused to grant
Buchanan the authority he requested. A
principal argument against granting his
request was that to do so would hc a
surrender to the Presitlent of Congre~s'
war power. The ohjection was a!!ain
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raised by Senators opposed to President
Wilson's request for conl.,rressional authority to tak(' (\t'f('m;ive nlea:;II\'c':; in
proteetion of AIIH'riean shipping. Corwin tells us that Wilson wcnt ah('acl and
armed American merchant vessels despite congressional inaelion.
More rccent experience has seen Congress take a broader view on the delegation issue. In the 19,15 United Nations
Participation Act, Congress provided for
delegation of authority to the President
to engage in hostilities if acting pursuant
to an article 4:~ U.N. collective peace
force agreement approved by Congress.
Apparently, however. no such at--rrc('ml'nt has yl't h('l'n approwc\ by <:on/!Tl'~. And in thl' 19:>5 ForllloslI \{l'l'lllution, the 19:)7 i\\i,I,l\e East Hesolution,
alII I the 19(),l Tonkin (;ulf Hesolution,
Conl.,rress au tho ri;r. cd the President to usc
force to assist certllin arcas if subjected
to arllled lIltack. In the case of the
Forlllo:;a R(':;ollltion, [he 1\1iddle East
I{esolution, and the Tonkin Gulf Hesolution, all were passed over the objection of at least one c.ongressman, Senator Wayne Morse, that the resolution
amounted to an "unconstitutional prededaration of war." In none of these
situations docs the delegation issue seem
to have been considered very adequatcly, and the practice is prohably
inconclusivc.
Pro fe:;sor Wormuth, arguing largely
on thc basis of now defunct precedents
of domestic delegation law, urges a
strict antidclegation rule} 3 But the
do III!':;I i(' d('\t'gllLion 1II1:11ogy ('one!'r1H'd
with the limiLs 0 f conhrrcsl:iional delegation of legislative power is not only
(Iuel:itionahle today, but is also of only
limited usefulness in the war power
contcxt. The President has in his own
right hoth suhstantial Ullthority to usc
the military ahroml m\(1 authority as
Commander in Chief, neither of which
lire pres(~nt in comparahle degree in the
donwstie delegaLion ca:;('s.
And in vi(~w or the I,rreaL p()\\'('r or
the I'resid('nt to purslll' a diplomatic

course leaving Congress little choice but
war, and his grl'aL diserl'lion as COIllllIal\l\t'r in (:hic'f afkr formal I'Ongn'lI'
sional auLhori;-;alion is given, il ~"('IIlS
sOIlwwhat 'Iuixolic Lo lake a rigid 1II11idc:l"l!;a till n stalH~e. Mon~ov(~r, tlwre are
suhstantial prohlems in any antidclegation stance as to when Congress is
granting authorization with full knowledgc of the eircumsLanees. And what is
the standard for too broad a delegation?
Certainly the test would he unrealistic if
simply one of whcthcr discretion is left
to the President, as the President prohably always has the right as Commander
in Chief to refuse to order American
trooP$ into comhal. And IIl1le::s Con~ress speak:: Lo I he it'sue, he certainly
has very crucial discretion as to theater
of operaLions, weapons systems employed, and settlement terms, any of
which can he as deeisive for conflict
limitation as the original decision to lise
force.
It is hard to get away from the fact
that the war power is in reality a joint
executive-congressional power and that
the President is always going to have a
substantial discretionary role. The delegation problem is more likely to be
resolved by a pattern of practice responding to fclt needs than by overly
neat a priori eonstitu tional hypotlH't'l!s.
If there is to he a delegation tr~t, I
would suggest that it be one asking
whether there has bcen meaningful participation by a Congress reasonahly informed of the circumstances giving rise
to the need for the use or U.S. forces.
The fourth question is: To wltat
extent can the answers to the first three
questions he resolved hy the courts'? Arc
they "politieai questions" or otherwise
issues which it is unwise for a COllrt to
adjlldieate'?
The tradition of judicial review runs
deep in the American system. But it is
not l'very question Lhat is suiLahle for
judieial rcview, Considc'ralions or lack
of manageable sLandanl:; and inl('rf('rence with another coordinnte brandt
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of Government are reasons which the
Suprcme Court has given for dedining
to decide a question. Thl'se considl'rations frcquently arisc in the separationof-powers context amI are all present to
some dcgree in judicial determination of
the scope of Presidential authority to
use the Armed Forces abroad. For
example, what could a court do which
would not have a major adverse impact
on the course of a war if it wanted to
declare the war unconstitutional? This
dilemma has led one ingenious advocate
to argue that the Court should give a
declaratory judgment in sudl circumstances. According to him, "a dl'e1aratory judgmcnt would giw lillie comfort
to the othcr side in the negotiations
since the Executive can always go to the
Congress for a declaration of war if the
negotiations broak down."14
If that is thc case, one wonders why
the nccd for a declaratory judgment.
And in any event, the suggestion shows
a most unprofessional naivete in understating the possible impact of such a
ruling.
For these and other reasons, a U.S.
District Court in Kansas last .J uly dismissed a class action institutcd against
the Prcsident, the Sccretary of State,
and the Secretary of Defense seeking a
declaratory judgnwnt that they had
aded uneonstitutionally in the Vi(~tlla
mesc war. 1 5 Though Lhe scopc of the
Prcsident's authority to use the Armed
Forces abroad is a constitutional question, it is a question in separation of
powers with few manageable standards,
often running great risk of serious interference with legitimate defense requirements, and which is probahly suhject to
more lasting solution from the continuing interplay bctween the chccks
and powers of COIII,ITCSS and thc Presidcnt. Though I helicve that a decision
on the mcrits would uphold thc constitutionality of thl' exl'cuti\'c-con~lTl's
sional al'tion ill the Vidnam war, till'
rI'fusal to mljudieatc t he issue it' Cl'rtainly the wisest course durillg the

continuation of the conflict. There are,
after all, other c1wcks in our syHtmn
than judicial review, the chid HIIIOllg
them being the election of a Presidellt.
Let me hriefly apply these tests to
the constitutional issues in the Vietnam
confliet. First, the present magnitude of
the Vietnam war in terms of troop
levels, casualties, and impact on the
natioll strongly militates for requiring
congressional authorization. I would say
that the point at which congressional
authori1.ation should he required in
Vietnam was the initiation in Fehruary
I ')(1;' of the regular inLerdietive air
allacks against the North mill the first
t'u,;tain(·d lIS(~ of rI'gular U.S. eOlllhuL
units in the sUlllmer allli fall of E)();'.
And though I believe that at the
current level of hostilitics congressional
authorization should be required, given
the Korean experience and the hreadth
of Executive authority aeqllieseed in by
both COlIgn'ss and the President for the
last ;'0 ycars, argument to the contrary
can certainly be in ~oOlI faith.
Second, congressional authorization
need not and should not take the form
of a formal declaration of war. A joint
resolution authorizing the use of COIllhat forces in hostilitiet' ill Vietnam, such
as the Tonkin (;ull" Besolution of August ] 96-1., is preferable and adequate.
Preferable since there is no good reason
to declare war, since a formal declaration of war might connote an objective
of subjugating North Vietnam and thus
widening the war, and since avoidance
of NLF recognition at too carly a stage
in the negotiating process or prior to
reciprocal concessions may be an important diplomatic' goal. And adequate
since Congress authorized President
Johnson to usc the Armed Forces "to
assist any mcmher or protocol stute of
SEATO requesting assistance in defense," and the President's use of U.S.
forces in Vietnalll pursuant to this
resolution is constitutionally authori1.(·d
executi\'e-eon~rressional action. Sonll'
argue that Congress wus 1I0t awure of
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thc magnitude of the war which it was
authorizing, that the Tonkin Gulf Itesolution WlIS hurric(1 through ClIngr!!:;,.';
with a sensc of urgency pret:luding
adl~quate consideration, thal Congress
was poorly i1lformed as to the cxtent or'
attacks on American ships, and that
thcrefore the resolution cannot be taken
as sufficient con~essional authorization. But the language of the resolution
is certainly broad enough to include the
pre:;ent hostiIi tics. It is that "Congrcss
approvcs amI supports thc determination of thc President, us Commander in
Chief, to take all neeessary measures to
r('pcl any urmt'd a llack u~uinst thc
f(ln'l'~ (If tIll' lInilt'd Slall'S ill II I to
pn'\'('nt furllll'r ag;"'TI':'silln," ,\1111 I 111'Iil'\'" thal u fair n'ading (If lh,' eon~l's
sional IIl'halt'::: in their ,'nlird), :::hows
that alLhougllltlwn' was confusion mill
disagreemcnt ahout the scope of the
authorizution, the Congress and the
Senute floor lead,'r of the resolution,
Senutor Fulbright, were awure thut Congress was giving the Prcsident the authority, within his discretion, to take
whatever action hc dcemed necessary
with respect to the defense of South
Vietnam. In fact, that is the wording of
an cxchange on the floor of the Senate
between Senators Fulbright and Cooper.
TIll' same exchunge indicatcd 1111 undl'rsL1nding that the resolution was intcnded to ratify the constitutional process requirement of article IV of the
SEATO Treaty.16
AI though consideration of the
Tonkin Gulf Resolution was hasty,
President Johnson clearly went to
Congress because of his awareness of
doubts raised during the Korean war
as a result of President Truman's
failure to request formal congressional
authorization. The attacks on American ships in the Gulf of Tonkin were
the opportunity but not the object of
the resolution.
Th" Tonkin (~ulf itl't'olution hus also
h"I'n altill'kl'd a::: an invalid dc'I,'~atiou of
the ,'oll~es:;ionul Wllr power. Butl'veu if

there is u constitutional requircment as
to thc breadth of congressional delegation of the wlir power to the Prt~sident,
a proposition opl'n to c()nsidl'ruhlc~
doubt, the Conbrress which passed the
Tonkin C;ulf Resolution W1IS, I helieve,
reasonahly informed of the circumstances giving rise to the need for the
use of U.S. forces. It wus aware that
thcre was an ongoing guerrilla war in
Vietnam which had he en escalating
since 1959, that the United States had
had over 12,000 advisory troops there
since 1962, a figure dramatically on the
increase since then, and that recently
the President had ordered retaliatory air
strikes on facilities in the North. As
such, Congress was validly exercising its
war power no matter how desirahle or
iIIuminating additional debatc might
have bcen.
Although there are, as indicated,
difficulties in reading too much into
appropriation measures or other indicia
of congressional authorization, the subsequent refusal to repeal the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution and passage of military
appropriation measures also lend some
congressional authority to President
.T ohnson 's actions. This is particularly
true of the $700 million special Vietnam appropriation measure of i\lay
1965. This measurc, rcqul't'ted shortly
after President.l ohn:;on ':; major step-up
of the U.S. response, was billed as 1111
opporLunity for e:\pression of congres~ionul opinion on the huildup.
I,astly, although there are those who
argue for judicial review of the constitutionaliLy of the authorization of the use
of American forccs in Vietnam, the lack
of standurtis, the availahility of other
checks in the system, and the possibly
grave impact on the course of negotiations strongly suggest the lack of wis,10m of judicial revicw of slIeh questions
wh ilc the war continucs. Without passing judgmenL on all future questions
which may arise, Lhc constitutional
questions involved in the usc of the
Armed Forces in Vietnam should best
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hc left to rcsolution betwecn Congrcss
and the President amI almost ccrtainly
will he.
If in grappling with these questions
there is a complexity that tends to
ovenvhelm, or if we vacillate from
time to time in our thinking as to

precisely where the line should be
drawn, we can take comfort in
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s point that
sometimes the genuine intellectual
difficulty of a question makes a degree of vacillation and mind changing
eminently reasonable.

FOOTNOTES
1. See generally on the national executive and the usc of thc Armcd Forces abroad Edward
S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787·1957, 4th rev. cd. (Ncw York: Ncw York
University Prcss, 1957); Francis D. Wormuth, The Vietnam War: the President v. the Constitutioll
(!'anta Barbara, Calif.: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, April 1968); P. Kurland,
"The Impotencc of Reticence," Duke taw Journal, 1968, p. 619; John N. Moore and James L.
Underwood, "The Lawfulness of Unitcd States Assistance to the Republic of Vietnam,"
Congressional Record, 14 July 1966, p. 14,943, 14,960-B,967, 14,983-14,989; Lawrence It.
Vdvl'l, "Thc War in Vietnam: Unconstitutional, Justiciable, and Jurisdictionally Attaekablc,"
l\(//Isas T>aw Review, v. XVI, 1968, p. 449; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Rdation~. U.S. Commitments to Foreign Powers, Hearings (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off••
1967); U.S. Congress, Senate, National Commitments Report, no. 797 (Washington: 1967).
2. Felix Frankfurter, "Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer," U.S. Supreme Court,
Decisions (Washington: 1952), v. 3,t3, p. 579,593.
3. Mark DeW. Howe, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
1957). v. I. p. 26.
4. Craig I\lathews. "The Constitutional I'owt'r of the I'n'sidt,nt to Conc\urle hllt'nlational
Agreements." }'ale [,a /II J ollrnal. January 1955. p. :H5. 365. 5. U.S. Commitments to Foreign Powers, p. 76.
6. James G. Rogers, World Policing and tile Constihltioll (Boston: World Peace Foundation,
1945), p. 78.
7. A study prepared by the executive departments, Powers of the President to Send the
ArmCfI Forces Outside the Ullited States, 28 February 1951.
8. U.S. Commitments to Foreign Powers, p.9-21.
9. Richard E. Neustadt, Presidelltial Power (New York: Wiley, 1964).
10. U.S. Commitments to Foreign Powers, p.76.
J 1. U.S. Supreme Court, Decisions of the Supreme Court ill the Case of the Amelia
(Washin/:,rton: 1801), v. V, p.1,25.
12. Robert S. McNamara, "Address," The New York Times, 19 May 1966, p. 11:1-8.
13. WomlUth.
14. Velvel, p. 449,484.
15. "Velvcl v. Johnson," 287 F. Supp. 846 (1968).
16. "Maintenance of International I'eace and Security in Southcast Asia," Congressional
Record, 16 August 1964, p. 18,409-18,410. The relevant exchange was:
I\Ir. Coopt'r.... Does th(' Scnator ("onsider that in ('naetin~ this n'$olntion we are
satisfying that rcquircmcnt (thc constitutional prOC('S8('-~ n'quirement) or Arlid(' I V of til('
Southeast Asia Collectiv(' Ddcnsc treaty'? In otlwr words, arc we now giving tlw I'n$id('nl
advance authority to take whatever action he JIIay decm ncccssary respccting South
Vietnam and its defense, or with respect to the defense of any other country included in
the treaty?
Mr. Fulbright. I think that is correct.
l\lr. Cooper. Then, looking ahead, if the Presidcnt decided that it was necessary to usc such
force as could lead into war, we will give that authority by this resolution?
Mr. Fulbright. fl"hat is thc way I would interpret it. If a situation later developed in which
wc thought the approval should be withdrawn, it could be withdrawn by concurrent
rcsolution....

501
For a compilation of excerpts from the conlU'cssional debatcs supporting a broad interpretation
of pf{'sidential authority under the Tonkin Gulf Resolution see Moore and Underwood, p.
14.!H3, 14,960·67, 14,983-89. For a highly selective compilation of excerpts suggesting a
narrower interpretation see Velvcl, p. 473·77. To resolve the controversy, a reading of the
debat('.s in their entirety is suggcsted.

----'¥----

